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JÖRG ESLEBEN 
University of Rochester 
Ends at Odds: Conflicting Conceptions of Post-1989 German Culture 
Introduction 
Debates about the end of GDR culture and of post-
WWII German literature proliferated during and after 
the events of 1989 and took on increased vehemence 
in the Literatur streit, the literary quarrel sparked by 
Christa Wol f s narrative Was bleibt. Yet the terms 
employed were far from unified, much like the 
national construct Germany that provided the stage 
and most often the implicit or explicit object of 
conflict. One central question ignited particularly 
fierce controversies among artists and literary critics 
in 1989 and 1990: What culture was coming to an 
end together with the political system of the GDR? 
For some it was the totalitarian cultural politics 
repressing those creative forces in East Germany that 
wanted to transform their society into a more 
liberated and humane socialist formation, for others it 
was the socialist pipe dream itself together with its 
cultural sidekick Gesinmingsässheiik, the aesthetics 
of conviction perceived to have dominated German 
postwar literature. Yet another position was 
determined by the fear of eradication of a specific 
GDR culture and identity. 
With varying emphases, the proponents of these 
positions saw art and politics as intimately linked 
within the histories of both Germanies. However, the 
consequences deduced from this were vastly 
disparate. Ulrich Greiner's frequently quoted 
statement about the debates that "he who determines 
what was also determines what will be" (cf. Huyssen 
1991, 125)1 expresses the fact that all interventions 
have implications for cultural praxis past and future. 
One of the most hotly contested questions was the 
proper relationship between cultural and political 
spheres. The proposed answers were as manifold as 
the overwhelming number of contributors, so that 
any critique of the debates inevitably becomes highly 
selective. 
Many intellectuals in both East and West 
Germany saw the termination of the SED's autocratic 
rule as a chance to embark on an East German 
cultural and political "third way" leading away from 
1 Translations of all other quotations from texts cited in 
German are mine. 
both totalitarianism and capitalism. These authors 
proposed alternative possibilities in the shaping of 
GDR socialism and envisioned a close link between 
this process and the cultural sphere. Another 
grouping of participants in the debate did not share 
this Utopian optimism, but nevertheless saw art as 
having political functions, if only localized and 
mediated ones. 
In opposition to those who were continuing to 
advocate connections, mediated or direct, between art 
and the political sphere, other intellectuals 
proclaimed the end of the domination of East and 
West German literature by what they termed an 
aesthetics of moral and political conviction. 2 These 
authors, most prominently the critics Frank 
Schirrmacher, Ulrich Greiner, and Karl Heinz 
Bohrer, argued that the political and moral tasks 
assigned to literature led to aesthetic impoverishment 
in both German states, and, in the case of the GDR, 
even to an immoral interdependence of writers and 
rulers. They saw unification as a point at which the 
evaluation of literature could finally be grounded on 
purely formal, aesthetic criteria. However, as Eva 
Geulen has pointed out in her analysis of the topos of 
the "end of art" in the Literaturstreit, 
the very effort to relieve literature of its 
social conscience after unification 
confirms, post festum, the underlying 
confidence in art's ability to mirror and 
even affect social conditions by virtue of 
its form (Geulen 176). 
These efforts, then, betray their own political 
motivation to defuse the suspected (and suspect) 
critical potential of artistic form: 
They cannot surrender the concept of form 
because they cannot afford to 
acknowledge that the effects of cultural 
praxis are neither predictable nor 
guaranteed. To acknowledge this would 
2 As so often in German discussions of cultural production, 
literature will stand here as a pars pro toto for art, since it 
occupied this privileged position in the debates. 
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mean to concede that cultural praxis—past 
and present—also cannot be controlled 
(180). 
The problem that remains to be analyzed is to what 
extent and to what end proponents of the various 
positions in the debates wanted to control cultural 
praxis. 
Many participants in the debates about the end 
of GDR culture and the aesthetics of conviction have 
noted that the old classificatory dichotomies of East 
vs. West, left vs. right, art-for-art's-sake vs. literature 
engage prove inadequate when analyzing the 
conflicts and ideological positions or ends involved. 
The aim of this paper, then, is to provide one possible 
reading of these conflicts with the help of concepts 
that do not depend on such dichotomies. It relies on 
the concepts of the "universal" and the "particular" as 
outlined in Ernesto Laclau's and Chantal Mouffe's 
theories regarding the relationship of these concepts 
within conflicting conceptions of political 
community. Since the debates analyzed here are 
inseparable from questions of politics, it proves 
useful to read them in light of these theories. Both 
Laclau and Mouffe critique the uncompromising 
appeals to either particularity or universality at the 
basis of traditional models of political community 
and citizenship. A brief discussion of their critiques 
and of the alternative model they propose, one in 
which the universal and the particular mutually 
inform one another, yields some concepts useful for 
interpreting the German cultural debates and their 
relationship to political aspects of unification. 
The Particular, the Universal, and Political 
Community 
Chantal Mouffe argues that neither the liberal 
democratic nor the conservative communitarian 
model of political organization adequately describes 
current, culturally diverse industrial societies because 
each model is located at an extreme pole of the 
continuum between the particular and the universal. 
Mouffe's project is to define an alternative more 
adequate to current social realities than either of these 
poles: 
Our choice is not at all between an 
aggregate of individuals without common 
public concern and a premodern 
community organized around a single 
substantive idea of the common good. 
How to envisage the modern democratic 
political community outside this 
dichotomy is the crucial question (Mouffe 
75). 
In its pure form, the liberal model relies completely 
on the particularity of each citizen's interests and 
goals and allows only for an abstract, legal mediation 
between these interests based on a discourse of 
rights. Mouffe criticizes this once progressive idea as 
a no longer viable basis for community; likewise 
Ernesto Laclau argues "that an appeal to pure 
particularism is no solution to the problems we are 
facing in contemporary society" (Laclau 87). 
Communitarian thought, by contrast, postulates a 
substantive common good regarded as universally 
valid and binding for all members of the community. 
Laclau sees such universalizing of a particular 
ideological position or agent as the crucial self-
legitimizing move of both imperialism and 
communism. In the case of imperialism, European 
"civilization" was designated as that agent: 
So European imperialist expansion had to 
be presented in terms of a universal 
civilizing function, of modernization, etc. 
As a result, the resistances of other 
cultures were presented not as struggles 
between particular identities and cultures, 
but as part of an all-embracing, epochal 
struggle between universality and 
particularisms . . . (Laclau 86). 
Communism, for its part, legitimized itself as a 
universal idea and goal exclusively embodied and 
furthered by the Communist party: 
The vanguard party as concrete 
particularity had to claim knowledge of 
the objective meaning of every event, and 
the viewpoint of the other particular social 
forces had to be dismissed as false 
consciousness. From this point on, the 
authoritarian turn was unavoidable (87). 
It is plausible to link these broad historical analyses 
to the context of German unification, which in 
1989/90 was routinely represented in metaphors that 
either condemned it as an imperialist take-over or 
celebrated it as the defeat of communism. Many 
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Germans saw the need for a kind of capitalist 
"civilizing" and "modernization" of the GDR, while 
there were real fears of losing a particular GDR 
identity. The struggle over the future of the GDR, 
however, was primarily between different 
universalisms. 
As an alternative to both an isolating 
particularity and a hegemonic universal, Mouffe 
proposes a model of political community in which 
particular interests can be pursued while at the same 
time taking into account a universal common 
concern. This common concern should not consist of 
a substantive common goal, but of the democratic 
principles of freedom and equality, guiding conduct 
not as mere legal, defensive rules but as a positive 
identificatory project: 
It implies seeing citizenship not as a legal 
status but as a form of identification, a 
type of political identity: something to be 
constructed, not empirically given. Since 
there will always be competing 
interpretations of the democratic principles 
of equality and liberty there will therefore 
be competing interpretations of democratic 
citizenship (Mouffe 75). 
The interpretation that Mouffe espouses calls for the 
most literal application of these guiding principles 
and for a political identification as "radical 
democratic citizens" (80). She asserts that a "non-
essentialist conception of the subject" (80) is the 
necessary condition for such a construction of one's 
own identity by identification. Analogously, she 
rejects any essentializing definitions of political 
community, res publica, or societas that would 
obscure their constructed and negotiable character; 
instead, "it is crucial to see them not as empirical 
referents but as discursive surfaces" (80). 
The concepts of community as discursive 
surface and of radical democratic citizenship as an 
active commitment to the radical realization of 
universal freedom and equality hold some important 
implications for cultural praxis within such a 
community. Although Mouffe does not address this 
sphere explicitly, she argues against "the idea of an 
abstract universalist definition of the public, opposed 
to a domain of the private seen as the realm of 
particularity and difference" (80). This argument 
implies a rejection of the attempt to restrict art to a 
realm of pure, particular, private aesthetics. For 
Mouffe, the radical democratic approach 
allows us to envision how a concern with 
equality and liberty should inform one's 
actions in all areas of social life. No sphere 
is immune from those concerns, and 
relations of domination can be challenged 
everywhere (81). 
This ethics can be related to artistic praxis in two 
complementary ways. On the one hand, art is itself a 
sphere which should be based on free expression and 
the undogmatic acceptance of various poetics. On the 
other hand, the radical democratic conception of 
citizenship does allow for those kinds of production 
and reception of art which challenge dominant 
semiotic processes and discourses and which thus 
take part in the discursive shaping of the political 
community. Such a view is compatible with, indeed 
could profit from, the sharpening of the tools of 
aesthetic theory. However, it is incompatible with 
either limiting all art to political instrumentality or 
relegating it to the position of a disconnected 
particularity in the interest of pursuing a universal 
political agenda. 
The Discourse of the Nation 
The fall of the wall has not ushered in a 
Western McCarthyist conspiracy against the left and 
its leading figures. Those who oppose the idea of a 
"third way" and those who proclaim the end of 
literature's domination by an aesthetics of conviction 
come from both East and West; their motives are not 
uniform but varied, their views are complex and 
sometimes even mutually exclusive. The writings of 
Karl Heinz Bohrer throughout 1990 are a good 
example of this complexity. Andreas Huyssen 
identifies Bohrer as the "éminence grise of the whole 
debate" (Huyssen 138) because of his influential 
theses on aesthetics and politics. Huyssen's analysis 
of the fundamental contradiction in Bohrer's writings 
is very perceptive. On the one hand, Bohrer 
legitimately demands literatures that are neither 
ideologically coerced nor coercive, as well as an 
aesthetic theory freed from teleological philosophies 
of history. On the other hand, Bohrer reintroduces a 
political function for art by assigning to it a role in 
the shaping of a new German national consciousness 
after unification (138-142). 
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Bohrer's political enlistment of art is indeed 
very subtle. In an essay on the desirability of 
unification, he defines "nation" as "the symbolic and 
reflexive constants of a collective historical and 
cultural ability to remember" (1990e, 81). He then 
ties this ability to remember to literature by 
commenting on a French writer's essay on Germany: 
"It is quite obvious—thus the impression of the 
French woman looking for Germany so late in the 
game—that those young men no longer know the 
names of great poets" (81). It is not clear whether the 
"great poets" is a quote from the French essay or his 
own addition, but here Bohrer successfully 
establishes the link between literature, memory, and 
national consciousness. The loss of national unity, he 
suggests, has severed that link: 
The spiritual provincialization of the 
" F R G , " whose characteristic symptom has 
been the moralization of literature and 
literary theory, is indirectly connected to 
the annihilation of national unity and the 
atomization of what remained into 
political regionalism (1990e, 83). 
Here, Bohrer contradicts his own designation of art 
as a particularity irreconcilable with any universal 
program. He regards literature as an index for the 
division of the nation and the decline of national 
consciousness, thereby opening up the reverse 
possibility of a new post-unification literature once 
again participating in a strong national spirit. 
From this vantage point Bohrer's 
undifferentiated polemic against the preservation of 
GDR culture becomes intelligible. He cannot 
acknowledge a wide spectrum of responses by 
German intellectuals to the events of 1989 because 
such diversity threatens the homogenous national 
consciousness he propagates, most explicitly in his 
Merkur essay series entitled "Provinzialismus." 
Therefore, he devalues all historical experience of 
GDR intellectuals and attributes to them a univocal 
intention: 
I do not believe that the lost lives and 
careers of the GDR-intelligensia serve for 
more than painful and necessary 
psychological individual or group 
analysis. That will make the unified 
German atmosphere more stuffy. But their 
attempt, in cooperation with West German 
sympathizing literati and intellectuals, to 
save as much as possible of the old Utopia 
and the Utopian habit individually and 
institutionally will not be able to close off 
again the new free spaces (1990c, 1015). 
Bohrer denounces the supposed universalizing 
Utopian ambitions of all intellectuals on the left while 
suggesting that his sole interest lies in preserving the 
particularity of "free spaces." These free spaces 
ostensibly serve as guarantors for literature liberated 
from the grip of ideology and directed towards a 
sharpened "imaginative potency" (1017). The realm 
of culture will remain autonomous from extraneous 
demands. Yet in the very last sentence of the same 
essay, Bohrer reestablishes the link between culture 
and politics: 
The primary concern is not to condemn or 
salvage the former GDR culture 
existentially, but rather to limit possible 
devastating effects in a political and 
intellectual [politisch-geistig] manner 
without sentimentality (1018). 
Thus criticizing culture has far less to do with 
autonomous culture than with the politics of limiting 
certain effects. The context of Bohrer's other writings 
suggests that the effects he fears are those that could 
call into question a universal national consciousness 
or spirit. This spirit, for Bohrer, is the universal 
substantive common good around which the politics 
and culture of unified Germany should cristallize. 
Ulrich Greiner, another contradictory supporter 
of a purely aesthetic poetics, denounces this very 
elevation of the common good of the "nation" for its 
"unclear and irrational" arguments. In one of his 
early interventions in the debates (1990a), he rejects 
the concept on the grounds that it "is not a 
descriptive, not an analytical term, but one which is 
charged with emotional and political intentions" 
(1990a). However, Greiner does acknowledge one 
concept of nation as legitimate ideal, the "cultural 
nation" (cf. 1990b) which the East German writer 
Günter de Bruyn, among others, advocates. For de 
Bruyn, 
the concept is, so to speak, metapolitical. 
It denotes that the Germans belong 
together through culture and history, but it 
says nothing about borders, constitutional 
4
GDR Bulletin, Vol. 22 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://newprairiepress.org/gdr/vol22/iss2/1
DOI: 10.4148/gdrb.v22i2.1173
JÖRG ESLEBEN: Ends at Odds 5 
principles, and sovereign rights (de Bruyn 
65). 
Yet the metapolitical status of the concept seems 
highly questionable. In another essay, de Bruyn 
rejects the idea of reforming socialism in the GDR. 
He warns that "to force every national impulse to the 
right could soon prove dangerous" (cf. Naumann 28-
29). Whereas previously the cultural nation was 
described as independent of politics, this essay 
proposes the political concept of nation as the 
alternative to a socialist GDR. In the juxtaposition of 
the essays, this independence collapses and the 
cultural and the political concepts of nation come to 
complement one another after all. 
Such correspondence makes it difficult to 
regard Greiner's demand to abandon the "aesthetics 
of conviction" in literary production and reception as 
politically innocent. This demand is closely related to 
Bohrer's theses on aesthetics. Greiner's stance is thus 
implicated in Bohrer's and de Bruyn's paradoxical 
moves both to separate art from politics and 
simultaneously to enlist the cultural sphere for ideas 
of national renewal. The critcism of an aesthetics of 
conviction seems to mark a major shift in Greiner's 
thinking about the relationship of cultural praxis and 
politics. Earlier in 1990 he had confronted 
intellectuals with an alternative: they could either be 
"accomplices" in the political and economical 
"annexation" of the GDR or "wrenches in the works 
of that which runs or departs" (1990a). His later 
definition and rejection of an aesthetics of conviction 
reveals a changed attitude towards politically 
involved art. Most importantly, such art is accused of 
a universalizing politico-moral intention: 
In the aesthetics of conviction . . . work, 
person, and morality are inseparable. The 
text is the moral outline of the author's 
self. And the author is identical with his 
moral intention. This morality appeals to 
humanity and universality (1990d, 216). 
In the very attempt to convict the aesthetics of 
conviction of limiting and abusing art, this definition 
does precisely what it criticizes: by proclaiming the 
identity of the author's self with a moral intention 
aiming for universality, it presupposes the possibility 
of determining the author's identity and intention. 
Such a deterministic view betrays on the part of the 
critic that which he criticizes, namely the desire to 
confine art. Further, this confinement to a particular 
aesthetic realm is implicated in a universal agenda. 
It needs to be stressed again that this agenda is 
not a concerted conspiracy of fierce nationalists— 
Greiner's rejection of nationalism is a case in point. 
Rather, the project profits from a discursive 
formation thematizing the end of ideological art. This 
discursive formation can be used to convict most of 
postwar German cultural production—and especially 
the proponents of alternatives to unification after 
1989—on the charge of producing aesthetically 
impoverished art with universalizing intentions. If 
this is a legitimate, albeit generalizing, critique of 
aesthetics in the service of politics, accusing certain 
intellectuals of universalizing intentions also serves 
as a defense against potential threats to a universal 
national consciousness. 
The Politics of Poetics 
The desire to enlist cultural production in the 
service of a universal politics seems to have been at 
work among only a few of those intellectuals who 
wanted to see the GDR transformed into a democratic 
socialist state. For those who fostered it, this desire 
was a function of the perceived need to oppose the 
capitalist West with a cohesive socialist alternative. 
Stefan Heym's polemical essay "Ash Wednesday in 
the GDR" provides a striking example of one such 
negative Utopia: "The raison d'etre of the German 
Democratic Republic is socialism, no matter what 
form it may take; it is to offer an alternative to the 
robber-state with the innocuous name Federal 
Republic" (Heym 34). Despite Heym's sharp 
criticism of the SED regime, socialism, "no matter 
what form," remains the substantive common good 
of GDR citizens, and as Heym makes clear in an 
interview in the ZEIT, literature is assigned the 
function to spark thought in the readers and thus 
change them in a "social or socialist or so direction" 
(cf. Raddatz 13). Such a definition (in contrast to 
Heym's own multifaceted artistic production) 
universalizes one of many possible roles for literature 
as the only legitimate one, based on the belief that the 
political effects of literature can be narrowly defined 
and steered in a specific ideological "direction." 
The author here retains control over the 
meanings the text generates. The meanings are 
predictable, and so, in logical reversal, is the author's 
task. In an essay entitled "Braucht die Republik neue 
Autoren?", Fritz Rudolf Fries predicted and rejected 
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the choice between ivory tower or bestsellerdom that 
unification would pose for writers from the GDR (cf. 
Naumann 56). Instead, communism should remain 
the basis of a common poetics: 
The dream of communism, in other words 
of a world which provides justice for 
everyone, this dream is not at an end, just 
because some parties in some states have 
demonstrated once again the corruptibility 
of the human being. If the human being is 
still the problem, then it is also still our 
topic (56-57). 
Fries lays the blame for the failure of a universalizing 
ideology on the inability of some particular instances 
and agents to rescue the ideology and so legitimize 
its privileging as the substantive common ground (or 
"topic") for GDR writers, obliquely grouped together 
in the collective possessive pronoun. 
In contrast to this and similar attempts at 
preserving unity of purpose for the culture of the 
GDR, intellectuals promoted very differentiated and 
complex views of the interplay between art and 
politics. Around the end of 1989 and the beginning of 
1990, Christa Wolf offered ambiguous positions on 
this interplay. In an interview on December 11, 1989, 
Wolf found art "too painful and also too 
uninteresting" vis-à-vis the current political 
upheavals engulfing all thoughts and emotions (139). 
Here her view seems to converge with those who see 
art as completely disjointed from politics. 3 Yet 
further on in the interview she describes the 
unofficial culture of the GDR as having harbored 
"certain idealist values," now rejected by East 
Germans for material values, which at a later time 
might serve to counter "the unrestrained thinking in 
terms of efficiency and competition" (143). She thus 
conceptualizes a certain cultural sphere as a sphere of 
resistance, of opposition to both the reigning 
communist ideology in the former GDR and possibly 
to the capitalist ideology in the future East Germany. 
In her acceptance speech for an honorary 
doctorate on January 31, 1990, Wolf clarifies her 
3 Though perhaps her somewhat cryptic use of "painful" 
might point to the possible reemergence of the nexus 
between art, painful personal memories, and politics which 
Wolf explored in her text Kindheitsmuster. 
view of the type of resistance literature under the 
SED regime was advocating: 
For years the literature in conscious 
opposition had posed certain tasks for 
itself: to create or strengthen critical 
consciousness in its readers by naming 
contradictions which for a long time had 
been articulated nowhere else; to 
encourage readers to resist against lies, 
hypocrisy, and resignation; to keep alive 
our language and other traditions from 
German literature and history which were 
to be cut off; and, last but not least, to 
defend moral values which were to be 
sacrificed to the reigning ideology (158-
159). 
What emerges is a perhaps idealized but wholly 
defensive view of literature's political impact. Wolf 
conceptualizes art not as pursuing a universal telos, 
but as defending particularities against the SED's 
universal coercion. In contrast to the reductive 
definition of the "aesthetics of conviction," even 
moral values seem here to have a particular, strategic 
place in art in the face of their threatened extinction. 
Further on in the speech, Wolf indicates that art in 
the context of early 1990 has been relieved of its task 
of resistance: 
But what about art meanwhile? The post it 
occupied for so long is vacant. This 
release from a perpetual excessive demand 
is a relief, but I also observe irritations . . . 
(161). 
The separation of art from politics is perceived 
ambiguously, as relief and irritation. Christa Wolf 
was far from avidly defending the "aesthetics of 
conviction" for which she was so often cited as the 
prime example. 
Other intellectuals demanded sharper departures 
from the idea of democratic socialism and art's 
instrumentalization within this idea. Uwe Kolbe, in 
an "open letter," rejected efforts such as Heym's and 
Fries' as a "revived politics of the popular front" and 
as a sign for the "narrow-mindedness of . . . the 
intelligensia-turned-social-class" (cf. Naumann 87). 
Instead of a universalizing politics, Kolbe demands 
"a state that can sustain dissent. It should feed on the 
collision of opinions, philosophies, views" (89). 
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Although the explicit theme here is the political 
future of the GDR, cultural praxis is implicated in the 
address. Kolbe admonishes intellectuals, including 
artists, that they "cannot enlighten from above" (90). 
This calls for a revision of the conceptualization of 
art, and Kolbe hints at one possible role art might 
play by asking: "Don't we above all have questions 
ourselves?" (90). This question captures a central 
theme of many responses by artists to the events of 
1989: the right and duty to foster ambiguity. After 
all, the demand for clarity had been imposed on East 
German writers and artists for many years, and on 
both sides of the intra-German border. In the GDR, 
the SED at first demanded an art that was clearly 
"Socialist" and later one that at least was not 
obviously subversive; in the Federal Republic, the 
more amorphous "public" somewhat paradoxically 
demanded an art that could clearly be read as hidden 
criticism of the totalitarian structures in the GDR. So 
a dominant concern in many interventions is claiming 
the right to ambiguity, the right not to know all the 
answers and to question simplifying answers.4 
Such ambiguity finds its correspondence in the 
constitutive characteristic of literary texts. As East 
German writer and filmmaker Helga Schütz reminds 
us, "language is polyvalent, and just this polyvalence 
makes for the allure of writing" (cf. Dodds, 145). 
Thus, literature could become one of the sites where 
the social contradictions and ambiguities of the 
unification process, which have been denied and 
covered up by political institutions and discourses, 
are expressed and worked through. The task of 
transforming literature into a part of the discursive 
surface that is society is delegated to the readers. Art 
is relieved of the task of stirring readers to political 
action and transforming society; instead, it serves as 
a location of the discursive process of forming a 
community through identifications. The particular 
reader becomes responsible for the forms these 
identifications take. 
Was bleibt? 
In the wake of the fall of 1989 many 
interpretations emerged as to what was ending 
politically as well as culturally in the newly unified 
Germany. These interpretations necessarily entailed 
prognoses or demands for the future forms of 
political community and cultural praxis. There were 
those who demanded the complete separation of the 
political sphere from art as well as those who equated 
art with political functions; both "camps" 
contributed to discursive formations that projected 
political communities around the universal common 
good in the form of democratic socialism or of 
national consciousness.5 Opinions within these 
groupings diverged a great deal, however, and often 
individual authors who shared views on one aspect 
would sharply disagree with each other on another. 
Moreover, statements made by the same author in 
different contexts were often mutually contradictory. 
Therefore, in view of the complex situation, the 
following criticism levelled by Lothar Baier at 
Greiner, Schirrmacher, and Bohrer should be 
directed toward all those who proclaimed a Western 
McCarthyist campaign or an Eastern popular front in 
defense of privileges and coercive Utopias: 
Those who concern themselves with once 
again establishing hostile camps just after 
the end of German separation may not 
mean well for a future society. Such a 
society can only arise from a multiplicity 
of individual altercations and con-
vergences, not from the addition of 
collectives (Baier 1990). 
This critique stresses the need for the balance and 
mutual informing of the particular and the universal. 
For the relationship between the political community 
as a discursive surface and art, such mutual 
informing must be thought as a highly mediated and 
complex process. Aesthetic theory might be able to 
contribute to such thought without being coopted for 
an ideological telos. At the same time, however, it is 
problematic to demand that art be a "discourse 
outside of power," as Klaus-Michael Bogdal (603) 
sees Bohrer, Schirrmacher, and Greiner to be doing. 
If the "connection between power and writing" (603) 
cannot be controlled, it should not be denied or 
4 Recognition and acceptance of ambiguity were also 
demanded for biographies and histories on the more 
immediately political level, especially where relationships 
with the Stasi were concerned. 
5 Few contributors to the debates appealed to absolute 
particularity as social basis. One, the poet Günter Kunert, 
rejected the idea of democratic socialism as yet another 
attempt to forge a community in the age of the isolated 
subject (cf. Naumann 1990, 97-102). 
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neglected either. Art's unpredictable polyvalence 
makes it a suitable medium for questioning modes of 
representation and discursive practices, for complex 
mediations of complex social situations, and for 
examining the principles around which a community 
is formed. 
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